Conflicting Reasons, Unconflicting 'Ought's Shyam Nair
Introduction
One of the popular albeit controversial ideas in the last century of moral philosophy is that what we ought to do is explained by our reasons. 1 I will call this idea as REASONS EXPLAIN 'OUGHT'S. 2 One of the central features of reasons that accounts for their popularity among normative theorists is that they can conflict. For example, the fact that reasons conflict promises to give a neat explanation of (i) why in standard choice situations, an agent faces the task of choosing among a variety of incompatible options each of which has something to be said for it and (ii) how the competition of these conflicting considerations determines what such an agent ought to do. But in this paper, I argue that the fact that reasons conflict actually poses a problem for those who accept REASONS EXPLAIN 'OUGHT'S.
In fact, I argue that there are two closely related problems (or, if you prefer, two different ways of arriving at the same problem) that illustrate how difficult it is to make sense of cases involving conflicting reasons if we accept REASONS EXPLAIN 'OUGHT'S. The first problem is a generalization of a problem in deontic logic concerning the existence of conflicting 'ought's ( §1). The second problem arises from a tension between three ethical principles ( §2-3). Having presented each of these problems, I develop a unified solution to them that is informed by results in both ethics and deontic logic. An important implication of this solution is that we must distinguish between derivative and non-derivative reasons and reconsider what the commitments of REASONS EXPLAIN 'OUGHT'S really are ( §4-5).
The approach that I will take to these questions will be mildly formal. I do not assume that this methodology is to be privileged over other approaches. Rather, what I will do is present a number of simple cases that need to be explained and a number of plausible ethical principles that need to be accommodated. And I will show that in order to do this, we must spell out in more detail the connection between reasons and 'ought's that REASONS EXPLAIN 'OUGHT'S claims. I will then consider certain simple and tempting principles describing formal connections among reasons and 'ought's that might be used to explain these cases and accommodate these principles. I show that these initially tempting principles are inadequate and then go on to describe my prefered set of principles for solving these problems. The ability to handle these cases and accommodate these principles will be one piece of evidence in favor of my prefered set of principles and approach to the problem. That said, those who prefer an approach that eschews formal connections and formal modelling are free to develop alternative solutions to these problems. What I wish to do is only put the problems on the table and develop one systematic solution to these problems that spells out the details of the connection between reasons and 'ought's. Comparing this solution to alternatives is a tasks that must be postponed until the time when alternative solutions are developed.
The First Problem
To begin to see the first problem, consider the following pair of cases:
Speeding Law: The laws of the country set the speed limit at fifty miles per hour. We may suppose then that drivers have a reason to drive slower than fifty miles per hour. Given that drivers have a reason to drive slower than fifty miles per hour, drivers also have a reason to drive slower than one hundred miles per hour. 3 Fighting or Serving: Smith's country requires him to fight in the army or perform alternative public service. We may suppose then that Smith has a reason to fight in the army or perform alternative public service. Smith is also deeply committed to a pacifist religion that requires him not fight in the army. We may suppose then that Smith has a reason to not to fight in the army. Given that Smith has a reason to fight or serve and given that Smith has a reason to not to fight, Smith also has a reason to serve. 4 In Speeding Law, there is a reason to drive slower than one hundred miles per hour given that there is a reason to drive slower than fifty miles per hour. In Fighting or Serving, there is a reason to perform alternative public service given that there is a reason to fight or serve and that there is a reason to not fight. The first problem arises when we try to develop a systematic account why there are these reasons in cases that have the structure of Speeding Law and Fighting or Serving.
Before we look at what some systematic accounts might look like, it worth discussing which of the many senses of 'reason' and 'ought' we are focusing on in this paper. While I believe that the main ideas of this paper will apply to any sense of 'reason' and 'ought' for which REASONS EXPLAIN 'OUGHT'S is plausible, I will for concreteness fix on one. I will be discussing what can be called objective normative reasons. To borrow the now standard terminology of Scanlon 1998 , an objective normative reason for an agent to do some act is a fact or true proposition that "counts in favor" of the agent doing that act. What we have objective normative reason to do depends, in the first instance, on what the facts are and not what our beliefs are. The 'ought's that I will be discussing can be called objective all-things-considered 'ought's. These objective 'ought's similarly depend on the facts and not our beliefs about the facts. What makes these 'ought's all-thingsconsidered is that they hold in light of all the relevant normative considerations rather than only considerations from one domain such as, e.g., morality or prudence.
3 Cf. Cariani 2013: n. 1. 4 Cf. van Fraassen 1973 : 18, Horty 2003 : 578, Goble 2009 . It may also be worth noting that this case assumes a kind of pluralism about the sources of our reasons (in this case, one reason is due to the laws and the other is due to personal commitments). While the details of our reasons' sources are controversial, pluralism in general has been a commitment in the spirit of the popular idea in ethics since Ross. In any case, this pluralism is inessential to the structure of this case and is included only out of deference to the history of the case.
With this in mind, let us return to considering how to give a systematic account of the reasons involved our opening pair of cases. While there are many possible answers to this question, formal principles describe entailments among reasons perhaps provide the simplest general answer to this question: these principles provide natural explanations of why there are certain reasons given the presence of other reasons. In particular, the following two principles seem like the simplest and most obvious ones that do the job:
Single Reason Closure: if there is a reason for S to do a and doing a involves doing b, then there is a reason for S to do b 5 Consistent Reasons Agglomeration: if there is a reason for S to do a, there is a reason for S to do b, and S can do a and b, then there is a reason for S to do a and b 6
Single Reason Closure allows us to explain Speeding Law. Why is there a reason to drive less than one hundred miles per hour in that case? Given that there is a reason to drive less than fifty miles per hour and given that driving less than fifty miles per hour involves driving less than one hundred miles per hour, Single Reason Closure tells us that there must be a reason to drive less than one hundred miles per hour. But despite its tidiness, this treatment of these cases cannot be correct. This is because Single Reason Closure and Consistent Reasons Agglomeration cannot both be true. The crucial premise in the argument that demonstrates this is the platitude that we began the paper with, reasons can conflict. Though the argument 5 Throughout the main text, I will rely on our pretheortical grasp of the notion of doing one act involving doing another. Appendix two provides a simple formal model of this notion of involvement in terms of logical entailment in propositional logic (other more complicated formal models are also possible though I do not have the space in this paper to develop them). 6 Three clarifications may be in order. First, for it to be the case that S can do a is for doing a to be under S's intentional control in the sense that both (a) if S intends to do a, S does a and (b) if S intends to not do a, then S does not do a.
Second, claims about reasons are naturally understood to be doubly-tensed in much the way other constructions such as 'want'-constructions are. For example, 'John wants to eat dinner' is tenses both on the time of the wanting and the time of the thing wanted (this can be made vivid by comparing the meaning of 'Tomorrow it will be the case that John wants to eat dinner' and 'John wants to eat dinner tomorrow'. In most natural contexts, the time of the wanting is tomorrow in the first but not the second. And the time of the thing wanted is tomorrow in the second). I intend Consistent Reasons Agglomeration to concern cases where the time of the reason is the same but the time of the thing that there is a reason to do may be different (though of course whether an agent can do two acts may depend on the time of the things that there is a reason to do).
Third, throughout this paper, I will concentrate on what there is a reason to do. An interesting further question is what the reason is to do it. A generalization of the formal model that I describe in appendix two answers this question, but I do not have the space here to present this theory (though the theory entails that the reason do the conjunction is the a conjunction of the reasons to do each conjunct). In any case, it is not strictly speaking required to present or solve the problems that I describe in this paper. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to clarify these issues. doesn't require this, it is easiest to illustrate how it works by assuming there is a particular instance of conflicting reasons, one to do an act and one to not do that act. For example:
(1) There is a reason to meet Sam for a drink (2 Closure and Consistent Reasons Agglomeration entail the intuitively unacceptable existence of reason to torture a kitten. In fact, this is an instance of a more general result that does not require the assumption that we have reasons to do an act and its negation-it is enough that we merely have any conflicting reasons-and does not rely on the assumption that we have no reason to torture a kitten-it is enough that there is at least one act that we can do that we have no reason to do. Though I leave the proof to a note, the result is this: Single Reason Closure and Consistent Reasons Agglomeration entail that if there is a reason for S to do a, there is a reason for S to do b, and S can't do a and b, then there is a reason for S to do c for any c that S can do. 7 In other words, this results says that if reasons can conflict, then we have an explosion of reasons: for any act an agent can do, that agent has a reason to do that act.
This show that the initially tempting account of the cases is incorrect and some other account is needed. And there are many possible accounts of these cases. But before embarking on the task of 7 Suppose there is a reason for S to do a and there is a reason for S to do b and S cannot do a and b. Now doing b involves not doing a because S cannot do a and b, so by Single Reason Closure there is a reason for S to do not-a. And by another two application of Single Reason Closure, we get a reason to do a or c and a reason to do not-a or c for any c such that S can do c. Next notice that for any such c it must be that either S can do a and c or S can do not-a and c.
Suppose considering all of these accounts, it is worth knowing that the problem that I just presented involving conflicting reasons has the same structure as a problem in deontic logic concerning conflicting 'ought's. 8 The problem arises when trying to explain the above cases except replacing each occurrence of 'reason' with an occurrence 'ought' while also maintaining that 'ought's can conflict.
This structural similarity teaches us two important lessons. First, the problem in deontic logic is wellstudied. And deontic logicians have shown that the problem that we have just described is robust under a choice of a large variety of alternatives to the particular principles that we just looked at. That is, deontic logicians have looked at many principles other than the 'ought' analogs of Single Reason Closure and Consistent Reasons Agglomeration and shown that striking a balance between explaining our cases and avoiding something like the explosion problem is quite difficult. Indeed, in a recent survey article that is over one hundred pages long Lou Goble (2013) meticulously considers over twenty different packages of principles and illustrates the trade-offs they have between explaining our cases and avoiding explosion.
For this reason, I cannot catalog every twist and turn one could take to try to explain these cases (but n. 22 provides a rough guide to the different packages of principles that bear on our problem). I will simply leave it as a challenge to resolve this tension between explaining these cases and the platitude that reasons conflict. And a promising idea that I will end up making good on is that we can resolve it by mining the resources of the rich literature in deontic logic about the problem of conflicting 'ought's. Ultimately, this will mean that I will resolve this tension by continuing to accept Single Reason Closure, by rejecting Consistent Reasons Agglomeration, and by developing an alternative to it that still allows us to explain the cases that we need to explain. This may come as a surprise to some readers who find Single Reason Closure independently implausible and so see it as the obvious culprit in our problem. Appendix one addresses these readers' worries.
The second thing to be learned by comparing our problem to the problem in deontic logic is that our problem is strictly more difficult than the problem in deontic logic. This is because one solution to the problem in deontic logic is to simply accept the 'ought' analogs of Single Reason Closure and Consistent Reasons Agglomeration and reject the assumption that 'ought's can conflict. If 'ought's never conflict, there is no harm in the trivially true claim that if 'ought's conflict, we get an explosion of 'ought's. Indeed, I will take it as a working assumption in this paper that 'ought's never conflict. But what is important to see is that the analogous solution to the problem concerning reasons is simply a non-starter for our problem. After all, it is a platitude that reasons can conflict. 9 8 For general discussion of the problem of conflicting obligations, see Brink 1994 , Chellas 1980 , Foot 1983 , Gowans 1987b , Lemon 1962 , Marcus 1980 , McConnell 2010 , Pietroski 1993 , Sinnott-Armstrong 1988 , van Fraassen 1973 , and Williams 1965 . And see the helpful collection Gowans 1987a. For more recent discussion that bears particularly on the issues discussed in this section see Hansen 2004 , McNamara 2004 , van der Torre and Tan 2000 , and especially Goble 2009 and Horty 2003 Given my working assumption that 'ought's never conflict, we can, in fact, raise the first problem in a slightly different way. Almost everyone who accepts the popular idea in ethics accepts the following intuitively plausible connection between reasons and what we ought to do: 'Ought's Entail Reasons: if S ought to do a, then there is a reason for S to do a This then is the first problem: there is a tension between giving a systematic account of certain simple cases and the platitude that reasons conflict. As I said, my solution will be to accept Single Reason Closure and develop an alternative to Consistent Reasons Agglomeration that explains our cases and is informed by work in deontic logic.
Conflicting Reasons and How Reasons Explain What We Ought to Do
But before I present my solution, we should consider a second problem. This problem is similar to one that John Horty and Lou Goble have discussed in earlier work. 10 But the contribution of the problem that I will present is that it highlights a tension between three plausible ethical principles. We have already encountered the first two principles in passing: 10 Horty 2003: 572-573 was the first to notice the issue discussed in §3.1. But, as he presents it, the difficulty is narrowly tailored to the view in Brink 1994. Horty does not isolate the problem as one that arises from accepting the three principles discussed below. Horty also does not consider, as we will below, whether the view can be saved by supplementing it with principles concerning entailments among reasons. Another possible explanation might go like this: What explains why an agent ought to do something is that it leads to the best outcome. What explains why an agent has a reason to do something is that it leads to an outcome that is better than another outcome in some respect. So if you ought to do a, then this must be because doing a has the best outcome. And if doing a has the best outcome, then doing a has an outcome that is better than another outcome in some respect. We have, then, the three elements of our second problem Reasons Can Conflict, 'Ought's Cannot Conflict, and Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly. In the next section, I will show how there is a tension between these three theses.
The Tension
We can illustrate the tension between these principles by considering two cases.
Two Breakfasts
The first case to consider is the following one:
Mary promised Jeff that she would meet him downtown for breakfast. Mary also promised Scott that she would meet him by the beach for breakfast. These promises are equally important. Even though Mary can make it to either of the breakfasts, she can't make it to both because downtown and the beach are too far apart.
In Two Breakfasts, Mary's promise to Jeff gives her a reason to meet Jeff downtown for breakfast and her promise to Scott gives her a reason to meet Scott by the beach for breakfast. Since she cannot do both, this means that her reasons conflict. Given Reasons Can Conflict, we should expect there to be cases involving conflicting reasons like Mary's. And while Reasons Can Conflict doesn't entail that there are cases involving equally good conflicting reasons, Two Breakfasts is plausibly such a case: since the promises that Mary made are equally important, plausibly the reasons that stem from them are equally important as well. Finally, we may also stipulate that Mary does not have any other reasons that conflict with keeping either promise.
Given that Mary's reasons are equally good, what should she do? There seem to be only two plausible answers to this question. One answer is that Mary ought to meet Jeff for breakfast and Mary ought to meet Scott for breakfast. Unfortunately, this answer is ruled out by 'Ought's Cannot Conflict. Since Mary cannot go to both breakfasts, 'Ought's Cannot Conflict entails that it cannot be that she ought to go to each breakfast.
The only other plausible answer to our question about Mary's case is that she ought to meet Scott for breakfast or meet Jeff for breakfast. 16 Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly tells us that in order to explain why we ought to do a we need to at least show that there is a reason to do that very act, a. So if we are to explain why Mary ought to meet Jeff or Scott, we need to show that there is a reason for Mary to meet Jeff or Scott.
And maybe there is a reason to meet Jeff or Scott in Two Breakfasts. Maybe the promise to Jeff is a reason to do that. Or maybe her promises taken together are the reason. It is not important for our purposes to decide which of these claims is correct.
What is important is to see is the general point that Two Breakfasts illustrates. It illustrates that in cases involving conflicting reasons, we need to provide some general principle that entails that there is a reason to do disjunctive acts like meeting Jeff or Scott. Two Breakfasts illustrates this general point because it was the structural feature of this case-that it involved conflicting equally good reasons-combined with our three theses-Reasons Can Conflict, 'Ought's Cannot Conflict, and Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly-that led us to the result that we need to have a reason to do this disjunctive act. What this means is that unless we accept a general principle that entails that there are reasons to do disjunctive acts in cases involving conflicting reasons like Two Breakfasts, our three theses will be incompatible.
So what principle might we use to get the right result in cases like Mary's? We have already encountered one that looks promising, Single Reason Closure (which, recall, says that if there is a reason for S to do a and doing a involves doing b, then there is a reason to do b). As we saw, Single Reason Closure allows us to 16 According to Horty 2003: 570-571 , this so-called "disjunctive response" to cases like Mary's was first explicitly stated in Donogan 1984. It has since been endorsed by Brink 1994 , Horty 2003 and Goble 2013 I have claimed that we do not want to say that Mary ought to do nothing. But one might object that it would be unfair to keep one promise rather than the other so Mary ought to keep neither and do nothing. I have three responses to this objection. First, though here is not the place to argue about first order issues in the theory of promises and fairness, I will simply report that I do not think it is unfair to keep one of the promises in this case. Second, insofar as we accept that it is unfair, the most natural way to capture this is to claim that there is a strong reason not to keep exactly one promise in this case. If we were to do that, then the case at hand would not be one of the structure that I intended it to be (one where there are only two relevant reasons and they are equally good but incompatible), but the objection would also would not undermine the structural claim that I am making. Third, consider a different case where the competition is not between two promises but between a promise and, e.g., harm to others, the agent's own rational aims, or pleasure. Though people's judgments about exactly which cases involving these kinds of reasons are ones where the reasons that are not worse than one another, people generally will agree that there are such cases. In such cases, I claim that the agent ought to perform the disjunctive act. And in such cases issues of fairness have no obvious role to play. Thanks to Nick Laskowski and an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point. 
Lunch-Coffee-Dinner
Unfortunately, Single Reason Closure alone won't suffice to explain the full range of cases involving conflicting reasons. Consider for example the case of Sally:
Lunch-Coffee-Dinner Sally has made three promises. She promised Tom that she will meet him for lunch downtown. She promised Jack that she will meet him for coffee by the beach. She promised Ann that she will meet her for dinner in Santa Barbara. While Sally can make it to lunch and coffee, can make it to lunch and dinner, and can make it to coffee and dinner, she cannot make it to lunch, coffee, and dinner. There just isn't enough time for all that driving.
In this case, Sally has a reason to meet Tom for lunch downtown, a reason to meet Jack for coffee by the beach, and a reason to meet Ann for dinner in Santa Barbara. While Sally can do any two of these things, she cannot do all three. As before, Reasons Can Conflict should lead us to expect that there are cases like LunchCoffee-Dinner. And it is independently plausible that Lunch-Coffee-Dinner is one involving equally good conflicting reasons.
Given that Sally's reasons are equally good, what should she do? One plausible answer is that Sally ought to meet Tom, ought to meet Jack, and ought to meet Ann. But presumably the spirit of 'Ought's Cannot Conflict tells us that just as pairs of 'ought's cannot conflict, sets of 'ought's cannot conflict either.
The only other plausible thing to say about this case is that Sally ought to perform the disjunctive act of meeting Tom and Jack or meeting Tom and Ann or meeting Jack and Ann. That is, Sally ought to perform this act that is a disjunction of conjunctions. 19 And, recall, according to Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly, to explain why we ought to do a we need a reason to do a itself. So to explain why Sally ought to do this disjunction of conjunctions we need to show that there is a reason to do this disjunction of conjunctions.
This means that we need our general principles to entail that such a reason exists in cases like LunchCoffee-Dinner. Unfortunately, Single Reason Closure alone does not do this. If we apply Single Reason Closure to any of the individual reasons, the best we can do is generate a reason to meet Tom or meet Jack or meet Ann. But this is not the disjunction that we want. We want a disjunction of conjunctions. This is important because we want to be able to say that Sally ought to do at least two of the three acts and the simple disjunctions that Single Reason Closure gets us do not entail that there is a reason to do at least two of the three acts. Thus, Single 18 This is of course not the only principle that could be used to tackle this case. One could instead adopt the principle that if there is a reason to do a and a reason to do b, then there is a reason to do a or b. As I said, I will not have the space here to discuss all the alternative principles that one might try because there are too many to discuss (but see n. 22 for a guide to what the issues with different families of principles are). My aim is to only present one solution to the problems developed in this paper. That said, it is worth noting that adopting this principle and rejecting Single Reason Closure would leave Speeding Law unexplained. 19 In light of these two problems concerning conflicting reasons, I conclude that there is work to be done to make sense of cases involving conflicting reasons if we accept REASONS EXPLAIN 'OUGHT'S. Having illustrated this, I turn to developing my own solution.
Toward a Solution
As I have already said, there are many different principles that we could use to try to solve our two problems. But I will not pursue the project of canvassing the full range of these principles. Instead, since the problem of conflicting 'ought's is relatively well-known (in deontic logic at least), I begin by taking up the conjecture for solving the first problem that I mentioned earlier. The conjecture was that the solution to the first problem will have the same structure as solutions to the problem of conflicting 'ought's that allow for the existence of such 'ought's. I take up this conjecture in two stages. First I describe a certain structure shared by many solutions to the problem of conflicting 'ought's ( §4.1). Second I turn to some familiar ideas in moral philosophy in order to adapt this structural feature to cases involving reasons ( §4.2).
While this only directly tells us how to solve the first problem, I observe that it also indirectly suggests that the solution to the second problem is to deny Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly ( §4.3). §5 develops these suggestions in greater detail and shows that they solve our problem.
The Structure of Agglomeration
The conjecture that we are pursuing is this: since our problem has the same structure as the problem of conflicting obligations in deontic logic, the literature in deontic logic might hold a solution.
Though I cannot discuss all of the details of this literature here, I can draw out, I believe for the first time, a certain structural similarity shared by many accounts developed in it. These accounts avoid explosion by denying the 'ought' analog of Consistent Reasons Agglomeration (Consistent 'Ought's Agglomeration: if S ought to (2) and (3) were claims about 'basically ought's. But since (3) is not a claim about 'basically ought's and since we said that McNamara rejects the idea that a 'basically ought' to do a entails a 'basically ought' to do b if doing a involves doing b, we cannot generate some 'basically ought' version of (3) from (1). Thus, McNamara is able to avoid this explosion result by blocking the move to (4).
It is a significant fact that McNamara's solution is just one of a family of solutions that have this structure. Other theorists solve this problem in the same way except that they do not focus on 'basically ought's. Instead they discuss good reasons, phase-1 obligations, prima facie obligations, etc. 21 All of these solutions to the problem do the same thing. Instead of accepting Consistent 'Ought's Agglomeration they accept something like Consistent 'Basically Ought's Agglomeration but replace 'basically ought's with good reasons, phase-1 obligations, prima facie obligations, etc.
It is the structure of these proposals that allows them to solve the problem. They can explain (perhaps, with unequal plausibility) Smith's case by saying that in that case Smith basically ought or has good reason or phase-1 ought or prima facie ought, etc. to fight or serve and Smith basically ought or has good reason or phase-1 ought or prima facie ought, etc. to not fight and show that it follows from this and their principles that Smith ought to serve. They can avoid explosion because in order to apply Consistent 'Basically ought's Agglomeration or a version of it that talks about good reasons, phase-1 obligations, prima facie obligations, etc.
to get (4) we would need (3) to be a claim about 'basically ought's, good reasons, phase-1 obligations, prima facie obligations, etc. But each of these views denies that we can use Single 'Ought' Closure on (1) to generate such a claim. Thus, it is the shared structure of these views that allows them explain to Smith's case while avoiding explosion. It is no coincidence, then, that so many deontic logicians have converged on this structure despite the fact that these logicians have approached the problem of conflicting 'ought's from very different theoretical perspectives. We should not go in for this as a solution to our problem because Goble's modification would not allow us to generate the required reasons in Two Breakfasts. Second others accept something like Single 'Ought' Closure and Consistent 'Ought' Agglomeration but go on to deny the derivation of explosion (see, e.g., Beirlaen, Straßer, Meheus 2013) . Though these solutions are plausible as theories of reasoning, I believe they are not adequate for dealing with (necessary) entailments among reasons because they give up on certain structural properties of logical consequence (see Nair 2014 for discussion). Third some views either fail to avoid explosion or fail to give any account of the cases that motivate our principles, for a comprehensive survey see Goble 2013. Thus, these three kinds of views cannot solve our problem. Finally, I have recently learned of a fourth kind of view Since numerous deontic logicians have converged on this structure as a solution to the problem of conflicting obligations and since our problem has the same structure as this problem, a promising idea is that we can get a solution to our problem by taking advantage of this structure. What this means is that we should hold on to Single Reason Closure and reject Consistent Reasons Agglomeration. And we should develop some reasons-analog to Consistent 'Basically Ought's Agglomeration.
Non-Derivative CRA
This insight will help us solve our problem only if we can determine what to use as an analog of 'basically ought's in our principle. To answer this question, I turn to a familiar distinction in ethics.
The familiar distinction is the distinction between things that are intrinsically, or in my preferred terminology, non-derivatively good and things that are relationally or, in my terminology, derivatively good.
Things that are derivatively good are good in virtue of standing in some important relation to other things that are good. Things that are non-derivatively good, on the other hand, are good but not in virtue of standing in some important relation to other things that are good. So for example, we might think that pleasure is non-derivatively good. And since pleasure is non-derivatively good, it may be that eating ice cream is derivatively good because it stands in an important relation to the non-derivative good of pleasure; it causes it. So causal relations count as one of the important relations that something can stand to something else that is good in order to count as being derivatively good. Second this distinction allows theorists to capture certain subtle properties of good things that would otherwise be missed. For example, pleasure is good and eating ice cream is good but these goods have different modal profiles. Pleasure is necessarily good but eating ice cream is contingently good. This distinction is explained by the fact that pleasure is a non-derivative good, the fact that eating ice cream is a being developed in work in progress by Lou Goble. This view involves a radical departure from Single 'Ought' Closure, but has other features that may allow it to solve our problem. Unfortunately, I do not have the space here to discuss the prospects of this proposal. 23 Cf. Kagan 1998 , Korsgaard 1983 To say that something is non-derivatively good is to say that its goodness is not explained by something else being good. This does not rule out that it can be explained in terms of some other normative or non-normative notion.
derivative good, and the relation it needs to stand to pleasure to be good is a contingent one. Thus, tis distinction allows us to make perspicuous the explanatory structure of our theories and explain certain features of the things that we want to explain that we would otherwise miss. Now that we have introduced this distinction between derivative and non-derivative and seen what is important about it by talking about goodness, we can apply it to other normative notions. We can then help ourselves to a distinction between derivative and non-derivative reasons as well as a distinction between derivative and non-derivative 'ought's. 25 So from now on, let's explicitly write 'non-derivative reason' and 'derivative reason' to discuss non-derivative reasons and derivative reasons respectively and use 'reason' without a modifier before it to discuss reasons without making a claim about whether they are derivative or In short, the proposal is that we can explain why there are certain derivative reasons by showing that these derivative reasons stand in an important relation to non-derivative reasons. Since Consistent NonDerivative Reasons Agglomeration is structurally analogous to Consistent 'Basically Ought's Agglomeration and since this structure is one that deontic logicians have used to approach the problem, this suggests that adopting this principle will solve our first problem. 27 We will look at this in detail in §5. But before that, I want to make a 25 Cf. Parfit 2011: vol. 1 39, Väyrynen 2011: 190 and n. 20. 26 Two comments may be in order. First, the exact analog of Consistent 'Basically Ought's Agglomeration would not say 'there is a derivative reason' in the consequent but would merely say 'there is a reason (perhaps derivative, perhaps non-derivative)'. So the principle given in the text is strictly stronger than the exact analog of Consistent 'Basically Ought's Agglomeration. But this stronger principle is plausible and also solves our problem. Indeed, I accept the even stronger claim that says the non-derivative reasons explain the derivative reasons.
Second, there are complications that arise from the fact that I am only focusing on there being reasons to do acts in this paper and not discussing what those reasons are. In particular, there can be cases in which there is a derivative reasons as well as a non-derivative reason to do an act where these reasons are provided by different facts. While the ideas I develop below are compatible with this, they do not provide as clear verdicts about these cases. However, a generalization of the model in appendix two that I develop in work in progress can provide a clear treatment of these cases. 27 The derivative/non-derivative distinction also allows us to notice a more restricted version of Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly that final observation that will suggest a promising solution to the second problem as well.
Rejecting Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly
The observation concerns how we might be able to accept REASONS In the next section, I describe the solution suggested by our discussion in this section in greater detail and show how it solves our problem.
The Solution
The idea that is suggested by the observations of the last section is that distinguishing between derivative reasons and non-derivative reasons will be useful in two ways. First, the distinction will allow us to develop a principle of agglomeration (namely, Consistent Non-Derivative Reasons Agglomeration) that explains our would suffice for our second problem:
Reasons Explain 'Non-Derivatvie Ought's Directly: If an agent non-derivatively ought to do a, then this is in part because the agent has a non-derivative reason to do a.
We can see that the problem arises even if we assume only Reasons Explain 'Non-Derivative Ought's Directly' rather than Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly. This is because what Mary and Sally non-derivatively ought to do are those disjunctive acts. This 'ought' is not explained by some other 'ought'.
Though I do not have the space to discuss the details here, the fact that our problem arises even only assuming Reasons Explain 'Non-Derivative Ought's Directly distinguishes it from superficially similar problems concerning instrumental reasons and 'ought's. See Bedke 2009 , Raz 2005 , Schroeder 2009 , and especially Kolodny Forthcoming and Millsap ms for discussion of instrumental reasons.
cases and avoids explosion. Second the distinction will allow us to explain both derivative reasons and what we ought to do in terms of non-derivative reasons. This second point is important because it opens the door to there being cases where you ought to do so something and have a reason to do it, but that reason does not partially explain why you ought to do it. Instead, there can be cases where you ought to do some act and merely have a derivative reason to do that act and in these cases, both what you ought to do and what you have (derivative) reason to do is explain by having a non-derivative reason to do some (other) act.
In this section, we will develop these ideas in enough detail to show that they really do solve our problem. Appendix two provides a simple formal model of these ideas that allows us to formally check this solution.
The Theory
Let me now describe how non-derivative reasons explain derivative reasons as well as what we ought to do.
Roughly, my idea is that given a collection of non-derivative reasons, we have a derivative reason to do anything that is involved in doing what there are non-derivative reasons to do. For example, suppose I have non-derivative reason to give comments on my friend's paper (e.g., because I promised her that I would) and suppose I have non-derivative reason to meet a different friend for lunch (e.g., because I promised this other friend that I would). In this case doing what I have non-derivative reasons to do involves both giving comments and going to lunch. So in this case, I have a derivative reason to both give comments and go to lunch-there is a derivative reason to do this conjunction in virtue of the fact that there is a non-derivative reason to do each conjunct and doing conjuncts involves doing the conjunction. Now this is only roughly my idea because non-derivative reasons can conflict. For example, it may be that there is a non-derivative reason to go to the store and a non-derivative reason to not go to the store.
Perhaps, there are these reasons because I have made conflicting promises. In this case, I do not wish to claim that there is a derivative reason to do the impossible act of both going and not going to the store.
In order to avoid this problem, my proposal is this: what we have a derivative reason to do is
anything that is involved in doing some most inclusive collection of acts such that (i) we have non-derivative reason to do each act in that collection and (ii) it is possible to do all the acts in the collection together. For short, I will say that we have a derivative reason to do what is involved in doing some most inclusive compossible set of acts that we have non-derivative reasons to do.
Let me illustrate how this account works. Suppose I have a non-derivative reason to go to the store, a non-derivative reason to not go to the store, and a non-derivative reason to go the dry cleaners. In this case, there are three acts that I have a non-derivative reason to do: go to the store, not go to the store, and go to the dry cleaner. Suppose that I can [go to the store and go to the dry cleaner] and can [refrain from going to the store and go to the dry cleaner]. Of course, I cannot [go to the store and not go to the store] and I cannot [go to the store, not go to the store, and go to the dry cleaner]. So these collections of acts are not compossible.
In this case then, there are two most inclusive collections of compossible acts that I have nonderivative reasons to do. One consists of the act of going to the store and the act of going to the dry cleaner; the other of the act of not going to the store and the act of going to the dry cleaner. The (singleton) collection consisting of just going to the store is not a most inclusive collection because there are other acts (e.g., going to the dry cleaner) that we could add to that collection and still have a collection of compossible acts that there are non-derivative reasons to do. Similar remarks apply to the collection just consisting of not going to the store and the collection just consisting of going to the dry cleaners. Another tweak that is needed is that we should focus on what is involved in doing any collection of acts of the relevant sort rather than what is involved in doing some collection. The reason why we should do this is that we are assuming 'Ought's Cannot Conflict holds. Let me explain.
Suppose I have made two equally important promises one to go to the store, the other to meet Tom for lunch. And suppose in this case I cannot both go to the store and meet Tom for lunch. In this case each of these reason is undefeated because, we may suppose, you have no relevant reason to do anything else and the reasons are equally strong because the promises are equally important. If we were to say that what we ought to do is what follows from some most inclusive set of compossible acts that we have undefeated nonderivative reasons to do, we would get the result that I ought to go to the store and that I ought to meet Tom for lunch even though I cannot do both of these. This is because the collection consisting solely of going to the store is a most inclusive compossible collection of acts that I have non-derivative reasons to do; similarly for the collection consisting solely of meeting Tom for lunch.
To avoid this result, we should say that what we ought to do is any act that is involved in doing any most inclusive collection of acts of the relevant sort. In this case, going to the store is not involved in doing any most inclusive collection of acts of the relevant sort and neither is meeting Tom for lunch. However, either meeting Tom for lunch or going to the store is involved in doing any most inclusive set of act. Thus, we get the correct result that you ought to meet Tom for lunch or go to the store.
To summarize then, we have an account of derivative reasons and what we ought to do in terms of non-derivative reasons. The account of derivative reasons is this:
There is a derivative reason for S to do a just in case and because doing a is involved in doing some most inclusive collection of acts such that (i) there are non-derivative reasons for S to do each act in that collection and (ii) it is possible for S to do all the acts in the collection together.
The account of what we ought to do is this:
S ought to do a just in case and because doing a is involved in doing any most inclusive collection of acts such that (i) there are undefeated non-derivative reasons for S to do each act in that collection and (ii) it is possible for S to do all the acts in the collection together.
To adopt one way of thinking about the kinds of explanations involved in normative theorizing, we can say that this account says facts about derivative reasons are complex facts about non-derivative reasons and relations of involvement among acts. And similarly, facts about what we ought to do are complex facts about (undefeated) non-derivative reasons and relations of involvement among acts.
The explanatory structure, then, of the theory has non-derivative reasons as basic and uses the fact that certain acts involve doing other acts together with non-derivative reasons to explain derivative reasons and what we ought to do. In this sense, non-derivative reasons function as a "common cause" of both derivative reasons and what we ought to do.
There is however a different explanatory structure that may have become apparent at this point. This is a structure in which the non-derivative reasons explain the derivative reasons and then derivative reasons explain what we ought to do. There are two comments to make about this alternative.
First, this alternative explanatory structure is strictly stronger than the one that I have offered. This is because while it is generally thought that if A explain B and B explains C, then A explains C, it is not generally thought that if A explains B and A explains C, then A explains B and B explains C. So the alternative explanatory structure entails my explanatory structure but not vice-versa. It is interesting fact that we need not adopt the more committal explanatory structure to solve our problem.
Second, it is not obvious absent further explanation why the stronger structure is correct for two reasons. First, the stronger explanation requires us to spell out the details of how what we ought to do can be explained in terms of derivative reasons. And this turns out to be surprisingly difficult for reasons that I sketch in a note. 29 With these clarifications in mind, let me now illustrate how this account solves our problem.
The Solution
We will begin by verifying that the account on offer captures the principles that we discussed and then turn to how each of the cases will be treated.
The Principles
I said that the package of principles that would avoid explosion are Single Reason Closure and Consistent Non-Derivative Reasons Agglomeration. Let us first verify that we avoid explosion and the see that this is precisely because we accept these principles.
The explosion result said that we have a reason to do a and a reason to do b and can't do both, then there is a reason to do any c such that we can do c. Here is a simple counterexample that shows that we do not get this result whether we are discussing derivative or non-derivative reasons. Suppose there is a reason to go to the store (perhaps a derivative reason or perhaps a non-derivative reason) and a reason to not go to the store (perhaps a derivative reason or perhaps not a derivative reason). Now one thing that I can do is throw my laptop on the floor right now. Let us consider then whether we get the result that I must have a reason to 29 In order to explain why we ought to do a in terms of reasons to do a, we must be able to say something about how the strength of derivative reasons is determined. It is in fact easy enough to say when there is decisive derivative reason to do a: there is a decisive derivative reason to do a just in case doing a is involved in doing any most inclusive compossible collection of acts that there is undefeated non-derivative reason to do. That said, whether a reasons is derivative is determined by whether the reasons for doing something are better than the reasons against doing this. So to actually vindicate this definition, I take it, we must be able to say in general when one derivative reason is stronger than the other and show that the definition of a decisive reason can be recovered as the special case of the reasons to do a being better than the reasons to do any alternative. This task is one that no one to my knowledge has accomplished. In work in progress, I show how this can be done with some considerable complication. But while the possibility of doing this is interesting, I do not believe that it shows that 'ought's are explained in the way the alternative explanatory structure suggests. This is because the explanation directly in terms of non-derivative reasons is considerably simpler and more elegant. Now the alternative explanatory structure may seem more attractive because it vindicated Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly. But there are two points to be made about this. First, I do not believe that Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly is a principle that there is independent reason to capture even though many theorists accept it. This is why I developed a motivation for it based on 'Ought's Entail Reasons. Second, as I am understanding Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly, it claims that the reason to do a is an essential component of an explanation of why we ought to a in terms of reasons. This proposal does not vindicate that idea as I explain in the main text. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this issue. It is still nonetheless true that there is such a reason to meet Jeff or Scott. And this is because this reason is derivative has those same non-derivative reasons as a "common cause". The reason to meet Jeff or Scott is derivative and arises from the fact that it follows from some most inclusive compossible set of nonderivative reasons.
More generally, even though Reasons Explains 'Ought's Direct does not hold 'Ought's Entail Reasons does
hold. This is because if doing a is involved in doing any most inclusive collection of compossible acts that there are undefeated non-derivative reasons to do, doing a is also involved in doing some most inclusive collection of compossible acts that there are non-derivative reasons to do. This shows then that the account developed here accepts the exact set of principles that I have claimed will avoid our problem.
Cases
I now turn to the cases that we have discussed. There are four.
First begin by considering Speeding Law. We want to show that there must be a reason to drive less than one hundred miles per hour given that there is a reason to drive less than one hundred miler per hour. Two Breakfasts was already discussed in §5.2.1. I showed that we get the desired result that I ought to meet Jeff or Scott and that there is a reason for me to meet Jeff or Scott.
Third consider Lunch-Coffee-Dinner:
Sally has made three promises. She promised Tom that she will meet him for lunch downtown. She promised Jack that she will meet him for coffee by the beach. She promised Ann that she will meet her for dinner in Santa Barbara. While Sally can make it to lunch and coffee, can make it to lunch and dinner, and can make it to coffee and dinner, she cannot make it to lunch, coffee, and dinner. There just isn't enough time for all that driving.
Here we have three non-derivative reasons that are equally good. 30 In this case, the acts are pairwise compossible but setwise imcompossible. So there are three most inclusive compossible collections of acts that there are undefeated non-derivative reasons to do. The first collection consists of the act of going to lunch and the act of going to coffee; the second the act of going to lunch and the act of going to dinner; third the act of going to coffee and the act of going to dinner. Doing any of these collections of acts involves doing the disjunction of conjunctions: going to lunch and coffee or going to lunch and dinner or going to coffee and dinner. Thus, in this case there is a derivative reason to do this and this ought to be done.
Fourth and finally consider Fighting our Serving:
Smith's country requires him to fight in the army or perform alternative public service. We may suppose then that Smith has a reason to fight in the army or perform alternative public service. Smith is also deeply committed to a pacifist religion that requires him not fight in the army. We may suppose then that Smith has a reason to not to fight in the army. Given that Smith has a reason to fight or serve and given that Smith has a reason to not to fight, Smith also has a reason to serve.
If we assume there is non-derivative reason to fight or serve and non-derivative reasons to not fight, we get the right result in this case. Since these are the only reasons in this case and you can do both of these things, they form a most inclusive compossible collection of acts that there is undefeated reason to do. Since serving is involved in fighting or serving and not fighting, it follows by our account that there is a reason to serve and that you ought to serve. 30 Since it is an open question in moral philosophy what the non-derivative reasons are, what entitles me to make the assumption each promise provides a non-derivative reason? I make these assumptions for simplicity. Many other assumptions but not all assumptions would work. All that can be done to answer suspicion about my solution on this score is to consider alternative proposals on a caseby-case basis.
For example, the alternative view that we have non-derivative reason to keep as many promises as we can or that we have non-derivative reason to minimize promise-breaking would work for my purposes But the idea that we only have non-derivative reason to keep all of our promises would not. This is the right result. If the only thing that we have non-derivative reason to do is keep all of our promises and we can't keep all of our promises, then it is not the case that we ought to keep two of three promises. Indeed, this consequence of my view shows just what is so implausible about this view of the normative significance of promises.
Similar comments apply to Fighting or Serving. Thus, though I cannot prove this, I believe my view will get the right results in these cases.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that two related problems show that it is difficult to make sense of cases involving conflicting reasons if we accept REASONS EXPLAIN 'OUGHT'S. I then developed a unified solution to these problems. An important upshot of this solution is that the distinction from moral philosophy between derivative and non-derivative reasons and work in deontic logic on conflicting 'ought's are important to the project of understanding how reasons explain 'ought's. It was these ideas that allowed us to clearly appreciate the structure of our problem. And it was these ideas that led to the central thought 
A.1 The Life of Single Reason Closure
In my experience, Single Reason Closure is a principle that some people find highly suspect. This appendix is dedicated to briefly discussing the status of this principle. 32 I should start by admitting that it is unlikely that what I can say in this paper that is not directly dedicated to considering all aspects of Single Reason Closure will satisfy everyone. This is because this principle, or more accurately a version of it concerning 'ought's, has a rather complicated status in ethics and in deontic logic: some think it is obviously true (Hilpinen and Føllesdal 1971: 22 and Nute and Yu 1997: 5) ; other obviously false. But, I submit, this fact-that people's assessments differ-tells us that a thorough and even handed assessment of Single Reason Closure requires careful consideration of both its merits and its problems. This paper will show some positive applications of Single Reason Closure. This contributes one important piece of evidence to the large body of evidence that we must consider in order to responsibly evaluate Single Reason Closure. What this piece of evidence tells us is that those who wish to reject Single Reason Closure must identify an alternative to it that is capable of resolving our two problems. So the main contribution of this paper with regard to Single Reason Closure will not be to defend it from problems others have raised but to highlight some underappreciated virtues of this principle.
That said, let me make two points about Single Reason Closure and the cases that motivate it. First let me mention one weakening of Single Reason Closure that avoids many problems for this principle that people raise (e.g., the problem that Single Reason Closure entails that we have reasons to do "tautological actions" such as murder or not murder). The weakening is this:
if there is a reason for S to do a, doing a involves doing b, and doing b is under S's intentional control, then there is a reason for S to do b where we say that doing an act is under an agent's intentional control just in case both (1) if she intends to do it, she does it and (2) if she intends to not do it, she does not do it. It will be easy for the interested reader to check that even this restricted version of Single Reason Closure gives rise to the problem that I have described when combined with Consistent Reasons Agglomeration. And though I did not complicate the presentation of my solution so that it only validates this restricted principle, it will not be hard to see that the solution could be modified in this way.
Next, recall that we considered Single Reason Closure in the first place because we wanted to explain why there is a reason to drive less than one hundred miles per hour given that there is a reason to drive less than fifty miles per hour in Speeding Law. The second issue I would like to consider is an objection to the idea that there really is a reason to drive less than one hundred miles per hour in that case.
The objection begins with the observation that one can drive less than one hundred miles per hour by driving exactly eighty miles per hour. But, plausibly, there is no reason to drive exactly eighty miles per 32 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this issue. hour in this case. On the basis of these two premises, the objection concludes that there is no reason to drive less than one hundred miles per hour.
Before responding to what I take the heart of the objection, let me make two preliminary points.
First Single Reason Closure alone does not imply that there is a reason to drive exactly eighty miles per hour so it gets this fact right. Second, not only is there not a reason to drive exactly eighty miles per hour, there is a reason not to drive exactly eighty miles per hour in this case. And Single Reason Closure is the most natural explanation of why there is this reason. Since driving less than fifty miles per hour involves failing to drive exactly eighty miles per hour, Single Reason Closure predicts that there is a reason not to drive exactly eighty miles per hour. These are two correct results about the case and the second result follows from Single Reason Closure and is a piece of evidence in its favor.
However, the heart of the objection, I take it, does not focus on whether Single Reason Closure alone predicts that driving exactly eighty miles an hour is something that you have a reason to do (as I said, it does not). Rather the heart of the objection is that Single Reason Closure predicts that there is a reason to do something (namely, drive less than one hundred miles per hour) and one way of complying with this reason (namely driving exactly eighty miles per hour) is not something you have a reason to do and indeed have a reason against doing. This observation seems to be that it cannot be the case that there is no reason to do an act which is a way of complying with something you have a reason to do.
So the bridge premise this objection relies on is this:
if there is a reason to do a and b is a way of doing a, then there must be a reason to do b or something similar to this perhaps restricted to cases in which you ought to do a as well. Since there is no reason to drive exactly eighty miles per hour, the objector concludes by modus tollens that there is no reason to drive less than one hundred miles per hour. My response to the objection is that this bridge premise is false.
My response rests on three claims. First, at least in some cases (though perhaps not all) we have a reason to accomplish an end E that gives us a reason to take a (perhaps necessary, perhaps not) means M to E that is not a sufficient means to E. For example, I may have an excellent reason to drive my friend to the airport and that gives me a reason to clear the snow off of my car.
Next consider that there will always be a sufficient means M' to accomplishing M that precludes accomplishing E. 33 To return to the example, a sufficient means to clearing the snow off of my car would be to murder my friend, steal his shovel, and use it to shovel the snow off of my car.
Finally I submit there is no reason to do M' (at least only given the reason to do E and the reason to do M that it generates). To return to the example, there is no reason to murder my friend, steal his shovel, and shovel the snow off of my car.
These three general claims then provide a counterexample to the bridge premise because there is a 33 There will always be such an M' because we can always let M' be [M and not-E]. reason to do M, M' is a way of doing M, and nonetheless there is no reason to do M'. More generally, this argument suggest that the bridge principle is false when applied to reasons to do acts that are generated by other reasons. It should be no surprise then that there is no reason to drive exactly eighty miles per hour in Speeding Law. 34, 35 This 
A.2 A Simple Formal Model
The formal theory that I will develop is an adaptation of a formal system developed by John Horty (2012) . I adapt the system in two ways. First I considerably simplify the system. Though my ideas could be 34 It is important to be clear here about why this response is not question begging against a reasonable objector. A reasonable objector may reject the motivation for Single Reason Closure for the reason provided, but she should not reject the first claim of my argument (the claim that sometimes we have reasons to take non-sufficient means to our ends). For those who wish to reject the first assumption of my argument, I do not offer any response. I simply note that this is a highly theoretical commitment that, to my mind, hardly provides a starting point for an objection to simple judgements about cases unless the commitment can be bolstered by strong independent argument. 35 Counterexamples to the 'ought' version of the bridge premise can also be had with the help of the simple observation that for almost anything we ought to do there are sufficient means for doing it that are impermissible. Some of these counterexamples may also falsify the bridge premise stated in the text but judgments about these examples involving reasons are less clear. 36 I discuss only two puzzles here. Begin with, a generalization of Ross's paradox (Ross 1941) . Though I do not have the space here to engage with the literature on this topic in the level of detail it deserves, let me make four points. First a popular solution to Ross's paradox explains the paradox away on pragmatic grounds (Castañeda 1981) . Second though not clearly impossible, it is not obvious that the speeding law case can be explained without allowing the Rossian inference: that case can be thought of as going from 'there is a reason to drive forty-nine mph or forty-eight mph or…' to 'there is a reason to drive ninety-nine mph or ninety-eight mph or … or forty-nine mph or forty-eight mph or….'. Third, Single Reason Closure is entailed by other plausible principle so those who reject it face the task of explaining which of these principles they reject. For example Single Reason Closure follows from the principle that if there is a reason to do a and b, then there is a reason to do a together with the principle that there is a reason to do a just in case there is a reason to do b when doing a involves doing b and doing b involves doing a. Fourth and finally, the Rossian intuition is suspect. Apply the same intuition pump to neither mailing nor burning the letter. Neither mailing nor burning the letter is an act that you do not have a reason to do and indeed an act you have a reason to not do. So this intuition pump suggests that you have strong reasons to not [neither sending nor burning the letter]. Now if we make the extremely weak assumption that you have a reason to do a then you also have a reason to do b where b is the result of performing a de Morgans transformation on a, it follows that you do indeed have a reason to mail or burn the letter. So the Rossian intuition itself pulls in both directions and those who wish to draw the conclusion that Single Reason Closure fails based on it must face up to denying much more than Single Reason Closure.
Next consider a generalization of Professor Procrastinate type cases (Jackson and Pargetter 1986) . Again, there is a rich literature on this topic that I cannot do justice to, but let me say two things in response. First and most importantly let me note that one prominent family of accounts of this case and solution to the so-called actualism/possibilism debate it is involved in preserves Single Reason Closure. This family of accounts is motivated by consideration independent of the ones here and I myself find these solutions plausible (see Portmore 2013 and Ross 2012 for a recent defense). Second, one of the original arguments used to suggest that we have a failure of Single Reason Closure in the Professor Procrastinate case involved appealing to a certain simple consequentialist semantics for 'ought'. But this semantics is controversial not only for its implication in first order ethics but also because (i) it is not the only consequentialist approach possible and there are alternatives that validate Single Reason Closure (Portmore 2011) , (ii) nonconsequentialist semantics abound that do not have this result such as the usual modal semantics given for the so-called Standard Deontic Logic and such as a more recent semantic treatment due to Wedgwood 2006 that integrates insights from logic, linguistics, and moral philosophy, and (iii) the approach that I develop is an alternative account of the nature of what we ought to do so the argument from Jackson's theory simply begs the question against it. developed using the full resources of Horty's system, I am simplifying here in order to introduce my main ideas in the most approachable form. Second as will become clearer as we go on, I interpret some of the objects in my system differently than Horty interprets the analogous objects in his system. As we will see, this difference in interpretation is important because it is what will allow me to do something Horty cannot do:
reject Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly while accepting 'Ought's Entail Reasons and thereby solve our problem. 37 Let's develop the system. To begin, instead of discussing action and involvements among actions, I
will simplify things by discussing sentences and logical entailments among them. Let lowercase Greek letters α, β, γ, etc. be sentences. Accordingly, we will also officially have to treat 'reason' and 'ought' as operators on sentences.
Next since we know that the notion of a non-derivative reason is going to play an important role in this system, we should introduce a way of representing them. So let !(α) represent a non-derivative reason to do α. While this formalism does not allow us to represent what the reason is to do α, we do not need to add such details to our system because our problem does not turn on exactly what the reason is.
Since we will often be interested in discussing not just individual non-derivative reasons but also collections of non-derivative reasons, we should introduce a device for representing these as well. We therefore use ℜ for a set of non-derivative reasons.
It will also turn out to be useful when we are giving some definitions below to have a function, Consequent, that takes a non-derivative reason and returns the thing that we have a non-derivative reason to do and similarly for sets of non-derivative reasons. So we define:
Consequent[!(α)]=α Consequent[ℜ]={x| y∈ℜ and Consequent[y]=x}
Next, we must distinguish the undefeated non-derivative reasons from the non-derivative reasons.
To do this, let's help ourselves to an ordering on non-derivative reasons ≤. We read !(α) ≤ !(β) as 'there is a least as good of a non-derivative reason to α as there is to do β'. We assume ≤ is a reflexive relation in the sense that the following claim holds: !(α) ≤ !(α) and assume that ≤ is a transitive relation in the sense that the following claim holds: if !(α) ≤ !(β) and !(β) ≤ !(γ), then !(α) ≤ !(γ) Finally, since we have seen that it plausible to think that there are equally good conflicting reasons, we know that there can be situations where α is inconsistent with β, !(α) ≤ !(β), and !(β) ≤ !( α).
We can now define an operator Undefeated that takes us from a set of non-derivative reason to the subset of it that contains undefeated non-derivative reasons:
Undefeated≤(ℜ)={x∈ℜ|there is no y∈ℜ such that (i) x < y and (ii) Consequent [x] is inconsistent with Consequent[y]} In other words, a reason to do some act is defeated if there is a better reason to do some act that conflicts with it. And an undefeated reason is just a reason that is not defeated. 38 , 39 There are many simplifications involved in this formalism (see n. 36), but it is enough for our purpose. And our purpose, recall, is to develop an account on which non-derivative reasons explain derivative reasons and 'ought's by showing that they stand in an important logical relation to non-derivative reasons.
What we still need to do is describe this logical relation.
To do this, we need the notion of a most inclusive collection of non-derivative reasons. We define this in terms a maximal consistent subset of a certain set as follows:
A is a maximal consistent subset of B iff (1) A⊆B, (2) A is consistent, and (3) it is not the case that there is a C such that C is consistent and A⊂C⊆B.
With this in hand, we can now define a relation |~HNRE that we interpret as telling us how non-derivative reasons explain 'ought's. This relation will hold between a collection of reasons of a certain weight and an 'ought' just in case the reasons explain the 'ought'. Recall that a collection of reasons of a certain weight is formally represented by a pair 〈ℜ, ≤〉 and we can represent an 'ought' with the operator O. So we may define this relation as follows:
〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE O(α) iff M α for every maximal consistent subset M of Consequent [Undefeated≤(ℜ)] where is the logical consequence relation of ordinary propositional logic. And we can also define when when |~HNRE holds between a pair <ℜ, ≤> and the claim 'there is a reason for it to be the case that α' which 38 Strictly speaking, what I have defined is the notion of a reason being not worse than any other reasons. A reason being not worse and a reason being at least as good come apart in cases where reasons are incomparable with one another. But in order to present my ideas as simply as possible, I will ignore incomparability among reasons. Indeed, there are a whole host of phenomena concerning the weight of reasons that I will be ignoring in order to present my system simply (e.g., undercutting defeat, attenuation, how multiple reasons can "add up" to provide more support for an act, reinstatement). Luckily, as I said before, my system can be developed using the full resources of Horty's system and these extra resources were developed precisely to understand these phenomena (see Hansen 2008 and Horty 2012 for further discussion). 39 We do not focus on non-derivative reasons that are better than reasons that conflict with them because the set of such non-derivative reasons is empty in cases like Two Breakfasts and Lunch-Coffee-Dinner where we have equally good non-derivative reasons (cf. Horty 2003: 572-573). we write as R(α):
〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE R(α) iff M α for some maximal consistent subset M of Consequent [ℜ] As I have defined it, R(α) is a claim about reasons derivative or otherwise. Having defined this notion, we may define a derivative reason as a reason that is not non-derivative. Formally this ends up looking like this:
〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE DR(α) iff 〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE R(α) and !(α)∉ℜ.
where DR(α) is read as 'there is a derivative reason for it to be the case that α'.
Thus, my formal framework adapts Horty's formal framework by thinking of the elements of ℜ as non-derivative reasons. 40 It is easy to use this framework to now formally verify each of the claims I made about the principles.
Here I will verify Single Reason Closure, Consistent Non-Derivative Reasons Agglomeration, and 'Ought's Entail Reasons. I leave it to the reader to perform the simple verification of other claims that she may be interested in:
(1) Formally, Single Reason Closure says that if 〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE R(α) and {α} β, then 〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE R(β). Suppose then 〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE R(α) and {α} β. Since 〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE R(α), there must be some maximal consistent subset M of Consequent [ℜ] such that M α. Since is a transitive relation and since {α} β, M β. Thus, 〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE R(β).
(2) Formally, Consistent Non-Derivative Reasons Agglomeration says that if !(α)∈ℜ , !(β)∈ℜ, and {α, β} is consistent, 〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE R(α β). Assume !(α)∈ℜ , !(β)∈ℜ, and {α, β} is consistent. There is then some maximal consistent subset M of Consequent [ℜ] such that {α, β}⊆M. Since {α, β} α β and since is monotonic, M α β. Thus, 〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE R(α β). 40 It may be worth noting how this system is related to two other systems. First, the system that can be found in Goble 2013: §4.4 is very similar to mine. When I came up with my system, Goble's paper did not contain the system that is now found in his §4.4. At that time, the system that was closest to mine did not validate 'Ought's Entail Reasons. Goble since has, perhaps independently, developed the system now found in §4.4. Second Portmore 2013 argues on very different grounds for a special case of my view (see n. 36 for further discussion). According to Portmore, if an agent has a non-derivative reason to do α, a non-derivative reason to do β, and α≠β, then α and β are inconsistent. In effect, Portmore thinks that there are only non-derivative reasons to do maximal consistent acts.
